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COMMENTARY
Massachusetts v. Sheppard: When the Keeper Leads




In 1914, the United States Supreme Court held in Weeks v.
United States1 that evidence seized in violation of the fourth amend-
ment is inadmissible in a federal trial. Few Supreme Court rulings
have generated as much litigation and debate as the controversial
Weeks decision. 2 In recent years, the exclusionary rule has come
under increasing attack. Several courts and commentators have de-
nounced the exclusionary rule as an imprudent judicial remedy
which fails its intended purpose of deterring illegal police conduct.
3
Still others have criticized the exclusionary rule for undermining the
truth-seeking process and freeing the guilty.
4
Recently, in United States v. Williams,5 the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit voiced its dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule
in a more concrete form. In Williams, the Fifth Circuit held that a
court should not exclude evidence where a police officer acts in the
* B.A., 1981, University of Denver; J.D. candidate, 1984, Notre Dame Law School.
** Assistant State's Attorney, Chief of Felony Division, Fort Pierce, Florida. A.B., 1970,
Loyola University of Chicago; J.D., 1975, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The authors would
like to thank G. Robert Blakey, Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School, for
his valuable comments and assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2 Nearly one-third of all trial-bound federal defendants file fourth amendment suppres-
sion motions. Of these, nearly 70% to 90% involve formal hearings. See COMPTROLLER GEN-
ERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 10 (1979).
3 See, e.g., cases cited in note 12 in/a; see also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amend-
ment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 0974); Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics toven it Doesn't
Deter Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 398 (1979); Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionag Rule, 26 STAN.
L. REV. 1027 (1974); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
REv. 665 (1970).
4 See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21,
150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (Cardozo, J.); see also Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule.: Why Suppress
Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 215 (1978); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable
Blunders?, 50 TEx. L. REV. 736 (1972).
5 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
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"good faith" but mistaken belief that his conduct conforms with the
fourth amendment. 6 Although other circuits have not followed Wil-
ihams' lead,7 the Fifth Circuit has not been alone in advocating a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The Attorney General
of the United States strongly endorses Williams and the use of a good
faith analysis in search and seizure cases.8 In addition, two states
have enacted statutory good faith exceptions to the exclusionary
rule,9 and legislation currently pending in Congress proposes a simi-
lar change at the federal level.10
Despite this increasing pressure, the Supreme Court has not
adopted the good faith exception,1I although a majority of the Court
apparently favors modifying the existing exclusionary doctrine. 
2
6 Sitting en bane, thirteen judges on the Fifth Circuit adopted an across-the-board good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule which applies whenever the evidence "is discovered
by officers in the course of actions that are taken in good faith and in the reasonable, though
mistaken, belief that they are authorized." Id at 840.
7 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
839 (1981); United States v. Thomas, 536 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Ala. 1982).
8 In 1981, the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime concluded that "evi-
dence should not be excluded from a criminal proceeding if it has been obtained by an officer
acting in the reasonable, good faith belief that it was in conformity to the Fourth Amend-
ment." ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT 55 (1981).
More recently, in a speech before the Free Congress Education Foundation, Att. Gen. Wil-
liam French Smith voiced the Reagan administration's disapproval of an exclusionary rule
which allows "demonstrably guilty" criminals to go free. Address by the Honorable William
French Smith, Attorney General of the United States, Free Congress Research & Education
Conference 3 (Sept. 27, 1983) (published by Dep't of Justice). Att. Gen. Smith also expressed
the administration's approval of a good faith exception. Id
9 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3925 (Supp. 1983) ("The trial court shall not suppress
evidence which is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding if the court determines that
the evidence was seized by a peace officer as a result of a good faith mistake or technical
violation."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-308 (Supp. 1983)(similar). For criticism of Colorado's
good faith statute, see Note, The Colorado StatutoO, Good Faith Exception to the Exclusiona,7 Rule:. A
Step Too Far?, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 809 (1982). Recently, the Colorado Supreme Court
refused to apply the good faith statute in People v. Quintero, 657 P.2d 948, cert. granted, 103 S.
Ct. 3534, cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 543 (1983). The Court interpreted the statutory good faith
exception to cover "factual" errors by a police officer and not mistaken judgments of law. Id
at 951. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Quintero, but dismissed the case when the
defendant died. See note 16 infra.
10 S. 2231, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); see also The Exclusionaiy Rule Bills: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on the Criminal Law of the SenateJudiciari Comm., 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1982).
11 See, e.g., Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 693 (1982); United States v. Johnson, 457
U.S. 537, 559-60 (1982). In both these recent decisions, the Supreme Court rejected the peti-
tioners' arguments that the evidence should be admitted under a good faith modification of
the exclusionary rule.
12 See, e.g., California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 917 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590, 606 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In addition, Justice
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Last term, in Illinois v. Gates,' 3 the Supreme Court bypassed a prime
opportunity to decide the good faith question.' 4 This term, however,
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Massachusetts v. Shep-
pard5 and two companion cases' 6 which question whether the exclu-
sionary rule should apply where a police officer seizes evidence
pursuant to a defective search warrant. Given a majority of the Jus-
tice's disdain for the exclusionary rule in its present form, some modi-
fication of the exclusionary rule will likely occur. Exactly what form
that modification will take remains to be seen.
This commentary focuses on the good faith exception and how it
should apply in Massachusetts v. Sheppard and subsequent cases. Part I
briefly sketches the historical development of the exclusionary rule
and analyzes the Court's gradual narrowing of the scope of its appli-
cation. The good faith exception espoused by Justice White in his
concurring opinion in Gates is applied in Part II to the facts in Massa-
chusetts v. Sheppard. Part III concludes by proposing a "harmless er-
ror" alternative to the good faith exception which would apply in
cases involving unconstitutionally vague warrants.
I. Evolution of a Doctrine
A. Case Histog
Since the exclusionary rule's inception, the Supreme Court has
continually debated the question of whether or not the rule is an
implied constitutional mandate. Unlike the fifth amendment, 7 the
O'Connor stated at her confirmation hearings that "the exclusionary rule sometimes inter-
fered with the administration of justice by requiring the exclusion of evidence obtained
through a technical error." N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1981, at 9, col. 3.
13 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
14 After requesting that the parties brief the question of whether the exclusionary rule
should be modified, a majority of the Court refused to reach the question because it had not
been addressed at the trial court level. Id. at 2321. Only Justice White favored addressing the
good faith question. Id at 2336 (White, J., concurring); see a/so notes 63-73 in/a and accompa-
nying text.
15 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983).
16 United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983);
People v. Nunez, 658 P.2d 879, cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 65 (1983). The Supreme Court also
granted certiorari in another case, People v. Quintero, 657 P.2d 948, cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
3535, cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 543 (1983). However, the Court subsequently had to dismiss
the case when the petitioner was killed. Telephone interview with Chief Justice William H.
Erickson, Colorado Supreme Court (Jan. 10, 1984). Ironically, Quintero was probably the
most significant of the four cases as it involved the question of good faith admissibility when a
police officer is not acting pursuant to a search warrant.
17 The fifth amendment states: "No person. .. shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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fourth amendment does not expressly provide for the exclusion of
improperly seized evidence. The fourth amendment simply protects
citizens from "unreasonable searches and seizures" and does not pre-
scribe how courts should enforce this right.18
The Supreme Court's adoption of the exclusionary rule in United
States v. Weeks marked the Court's first significant attempt to enforce
fourth amendment rights.19 Simply put, Weeks held that evidence
seized in violation of the fourth amendment could not be introduced
in a criminal trial. The Weeks exclusionary requirement only applied
to federal law enforcement officers who seized evidence in violation
of the fourth amendment. 20 The Court's strong language in Weeks21
and its progeny implied the Court's perception of the exclusionary
rule as a constitutional necessity. Justice Holmes, a member of the
Weeks Court, later noted that without the exclusionary rule "the
Fourth Amendment [is reduced] to a form of words.
'22
Thirty-three years after the Weeks decision, the Supreme Court
temporarily retreated from its earlier characterization of the exclu-
sionary rule as an implied constitutional mandate. In Wolf v. Colo-
rado,23 the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applied
equally to state and federal proceedings. 24 However, while extending
the fourth amendment protections, the Court refused to impose the
18 The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19 In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Supreme Court had suggested in
dictum that evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment should not be admitted in
court. This idea lay dormant for more than twenty years before the Supreme Court finally
revived it in Weeks. For another early Supreme Court decision which discusses fourth amend-
ment protections, see Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
20 At the time Weeks was decided, the fourth amendment was not yet applicable to the
states. It was not until Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), that the Supreme Court
recognized that fourth amendment rights are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and
therefore enforceable against the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
21 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Day stated in Weeks:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value and
• . .might as well be stricken from the Constitution.
232 U.S. at 393.
22 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
23 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
24 Id at 27-29.
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exclusionary rule on the states as an "essential ingredient" of the
right.2 5 The Court concluded that the exclusionary rule did not de-
rive from the fourth amendment's "explicit requirements," but was
merely a matter of "judicial implication. '26 Thus, the Court left the
states free, after Wolf, to employ remedies other than the exclusion-
ary rule which would be "equally effective" in enforcing fourth
amendment guarantees.2
7
The Supreme Court's decision in Wolf not to impose the exclu-
sioriary rule on the states inadvertently created tension and confusion
among state and federal courts.28 Finally, in Mapp v. Ohio,29 the
Supreme Court rectified this situation by overruling Wolf and ex-
tending the exclusionary rule to the states. In so doing, the Supreme
Court returned the exclusionary rule to its former status as a consti-
tutionally mandated remedy.
30
Following Mapp, courts applied the exclusionary~rule in nearly
every case involving a fourth amendment violation. Because the rule
appeared constitutionally mandated, state courts felt compelled to
routinely exclude evidence rather than risk Supreme Court rever-
sal. 31 This rapid expansion of the rule's scope led many commenta-
tors to fear that the exclusionary rule had overreached its original
purposes. 32 Nevertheless, courts continued to give the exclusionary
rule an untempered application.
Finally, in 1971, the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens v. Six
25 Id at 29.
26 Id at 28.
27 Id at 31. In a footnote, the Supreme Court listed various alternatives to the exclusion-
ary rule which states could use as a means of enforcing fourth amendment rights. Id at 30
n.1. Among those alternatives were common law and statutory civil suits against the search-
ing officer. Id
28 Following Wof, several states adopted the exclusionary rule on their own initiative. See
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-32 (1960) (appendix listing states which had
adopted exclusionary rule). In those states that had not adopted the exclusionary rule, how-
ever, a controversy raged over whether a state official who illegally seized evidence could
nevertheless have the evidence introduced in a federal court. This anomaly was promptly
labeled the "silver platter" doctrine. See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949).
However, in Elkirs the Supreme Court finally struck down the "silver platter" doctrine, hold-
ing that evidence unlawfully seized by state agents could no longer be admitted in federal
court. 364 U.S. at 223-24.
29 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
30 In Mapp, the Court defined the exclusionary rule as an "essential part" of the fourth
amendment's privacy right, for "[t]o hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to
withhold its privilege and enjoyment." Id at 656.
31 See€ genera4y C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL CASES AND CONCEPTS § 2.02, at 18 (1980).
32 Se generaly Amsterdam, supra note 3; Kaplan, supra note 3; Oaks, supra note 3.
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Unknown Named Agents marked a limit to unbridled judicial accept-
ance of the rule.3 3 In Bivens, Chief Justice Burger mounted a scath-
ing attack on the exclusionary rule in his sixteen page dissenting
opinion. 34 While Chief Justice Burger did not advocate complete
abandonment of the exclusionary rule, he suggested a "narrowing of
its thrust so as to eliminate the anomalies it has produced. '35
Chief Justice Burger's opinion acted as a catalyst for a gradual
narrowing of the exclusionary rule's scope. Following Bivens, the
Supreme Court began to curtail the exclusionary rule's application in
various "peripheral" areas of fourth amendment law. The Court
permitted evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment to be
admitted in grand jury proceedings, 36 in civil proceedings, 37 and at
trial for impeachment purposes when the defendant elected to take
the stand.38 Moreover, the Court imposed tougher standing require-
ments on defendants who wished to challenge fourth amendment vi-
olations.39 Finally, and quite significantly, the Court tightened its
federal habeas corpus standards, thus limiting the number of state
cases eligible for fourth amendment review.40
These reforms signaled the Burger Court's clear propensity to
view the exclusionary rule as a "judge made rule" and not a constitu-
33 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bives, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics acting under
claim of federal authority entered petitioner's residence and arrested him for alleged narcotics
violations. Id at 389. After threatening petitioner and his family, the officers proceeded to
ransack the apartment looking for drugs. Id Petitioner subsequently brought a civil suit in
federal district court seeking monetary damages for the police officers' unconstitutional be-
havior. Id at 389-90. A majority of the Supreme Court held that petitioner's complaint
stated a federal cause of action under the fourth amendment for which damages could be
recovered. Id at 390-97.
34 In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger criticized the exclusionary rule for suppressing reli-
able evidence and freeing the guilty. Chief Justice Burger also called on Congress to enact a
statutory remedy that would compensate innocent persons whose fourth amendment rights
have been violated. Id at 422-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
35 Id at 424.
36 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
37 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
38 United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62
(1954).
39 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (defendant does not have a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the seat of a car in which he is merely
a passenger and, therefore, lacks standing to challenge an illegal search of those areas); Brown
v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973) (defendants who do not have a proprietary or possessory
interest in the premises searched may not vicariously assert the owner's fourth amendment
interests in contesting admission of improperly seized goods).
40 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (denying a state prisioner federal collateral re-




tionally mandated remedy. 41 As the cases above illustrate, in a grow-
ing number of situations the Court has allowed the use of evidence
siezed in violation of the fourth amendment. In this gradual process
of "deconstitutionalizing" the exclusionary rule, the Court has also
narrowed the underlying rationales on which the rule is based.
B. Traditional Rationales: Deterrence and Judicial Integrity
Two distinct justifications have traditionally been advanced in
support of the exclusionary rule - one factual and the other norma-
tive.42 The exclusionary rule's factual justification is deterrence of
illegal police behavior. The Supreme Court first acknowledged the
rule's deterrent function in Wolf v. Colorado.43 Since Wolf, the Court
has repeatedly cited deterrence as the exclusionary rule's primary ob-
jective." Although proposed as an alternative factual justification by
some commentators, the Court has refused to recognize the exclu-
sionary rule as a means of redressing the injury to the privacy of the
individual search victim. 45 At best, the individual citizen stands as
an incidental beneficiary of a court's decision to suppress evidence.
The normative justification traditionally mentioned for apply-
ing the exclusionary rule is the imperative of "judicial integrity."
Justice Brandeis suggested that a government which uses illegally ob-
tained evidence to secure a conviction "breeds contempt for law.146
While frequently alluded to,47 the Court has never seen judicial in-
tegrity as an independent justification for excluding evidence.48 In
recent years, the deterrence rationale has by far been the preeminent
justification for invoking the exclusionary rule. Indeed, the Court
has listed the deterrence rationale as the major reason for limiting
the exclusionary rule's scope, refusing to apply the rule where its de-
terrent objectives are not served.49 Two recent cases, Michzgan v.
De~illippo50 and United States v. Peltier,5' illustrate this refusal to in-
41 See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538 (1975).
42 See Oaks, supra note 3, at 668.
43 In Wolf, the Court acknowledged that "the exclusion of evidence may be an effective
way of deterring unreasonable searches." 338 U.S. at 31.
44 See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 447 (1974); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
45 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347.
46 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
47 See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 537-38; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13
(1968); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
48 See Oaks, supra note 3, at 669-70.
49 See note 44 supra.
50 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
51 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
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voke the exclusionary rule where police deterrence cannot be fur-
thered. In these cases, the Supreme Court has laid the theoretical
foundation for a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
C. Peltier and Defillippo: "True" Good Faith Reliance
The Supreme Court has refused to invoke the exclusionary rule
when the police seize evidence pursuant to a validly enacted statute
which a court later declares unconstitutional. In Peltier, for example,
police officers conducting a standard "roving patrol" search uncov-
ered a large quantity of marijuana in the defendant's car.5 2 The trial
court denied Peltier's motion to suppress the evidence. 53 Shortly af-
ter the suppression ruling, however, the Supreme Court decided Al-
meida-Sanchez v. United States54 which held that "roving patrol"
searches violate fourth amendment strictures. On appeal, Peltier
urged that Almeida-Sanchez be given retroactive effect.
55
The Supreme Court rejected Peltier's argument and upheld the
trial court's suppression ruling. Writing for the majority, Justice
Rehnquist stressed that the exclusionary rule should be invoked only
where police deterrence can actually be achieved.5 6 Justice Rehn-
quist added that evidence should be suppressed only where a police
officer has knowledge, or should have knowledge of, his unconstitu-
tional behavior.57 An officer cannot be charged with this knowledge
when he acts "upon a validly enacted statute, supported by long-
standing administrative regulations and continuous judicial
approval."5
8
Similarly, in Michigan v. DeFillippo, the Supreme Court refused
to suppress evidence seized pursuant to an ordinance which was sub-
sequently found unconstitutionally vague.59 Applying logic similar
to that used in Peltier, the Court noted that it could not expect a
52 422 U.S. at 532. The police officers who stopped and searched the defendant's car
were acting pursuant to a federal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3)(1976), which authorized war-
rantless automobile searches within a "reasonable distance" of the United States' border. 422
U.S. at 539-40.
53 Id. at 532.
54 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
55 422 U.S. at 532.
56 Justice Rehnquist stated: "'[W]e simply decline to extend the court-made exclusion-
ary rule to cases in which its deterrent purposes would not be served.' "Id. at 538 (quoting
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 254 n.24 (1969)).
57 Id. at 542.
58 Id. at 541.
59 443 U.S. at 31.
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"prudent" officer to foresee a court later finding the ordinance
unconstitutional. '60
At best, Peltier and DeFillippo have only a marginal impact on
the exclusionary rule's application. The two decisions only apply to
cases where a police officer acts in good faith reliance on a law which
is "presumptively valid" at the time of the search. However, while
carefully limited to their facts,61 the cases do illustrate the Burger
Court's general reluctance to invoke the exclusionary rule when a
police officer conducts his search in good faith. To date, the
Supreme Court has not extended this "good faith" analysis to other
areas, such as searches conducted in good faith reliance on a defec-
tive warrant. It is this situation which confronts the Court in Massa-
chusetts v. Sheppard.62 The following section discusses how the good
faith exception could apply in Sheppard and similar types of cases.
II. Good Faith and Sheppard
A. Illinois v. Gates: Justice White's Good Faith Proposal
Last Term, in Illinois v. Gates,63 the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments on whether it should recognize a good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule in cases where a police officer seizes evidence
pursuant to a defective warrant. 64 A majority of the Court, however,
refused to reach the good faith question after finding that Gates'
fourth amendment rights had not been violated. 65 Only Justice
White felt the time and situation appropriate to address the good
60 Id. at 37-38.
61 The DeFilhppo holding only applies to arrest statutes which do not, by their terms,
violate fourth amendment guarantees. The decision does not apply to statutes which author-
ize searches in violation of fourth amendment rights. In those circumstances, the exclusionary
rule still applies regardless of the police officer's reliance. See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40 (1968); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
62 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983).
63 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
64 In Gates, police officers received an anonymous letter informing them of the defend-
ant's drug related activity. The letter described the procedure by which Gates routinely
transported narcotics from Florida to Illinois. After further investigation, which confirmed
this tip, the Illinois police obtained a warrant to search the Gates' home and automobile. A
subsequent search uncovered 350 pounds of marijuana in the trunk of the Gates' automobile,
and a search of their home revealed marijuana, weapons, and other contraband. Id at 2325-
26.
65 In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court replaced the "two-pronged" test for deter-
mining probable cause from an informant's tip with a "totality of the circumstances" ap-
proach. Id at 2328-36; see Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969). Using this more flexible standard, the Court concluded in Gates that
there was sufficient probable cause to support the warrant. 103 S. Ct. at 2334-36.
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faith issue.66
In his concurring opinion, Justice White outlined the salient rea-
sons justifying a good faith exception. Justice White denounced the
exclusionary rule for suppressing "inherently trustworthy" evidence
and generating disrespect for the judicial system.6 7 Given its heavy
costs, Justice White suggested limiting the exclusionary rule to those
areas where its purposes would be most effectively served. 68 Noting
that police deterrence is the exclusionary rule's primary objective,
White added that the deterrence rationale loses much of its force
where the police officer acts in the good faith but mistaken belief that
his conduct comports with fourth amendment requirements. 6 9 In
such cases, "the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule is so mini-
mal, if not non-existent, that the balance clearly favors the rule's
modification.
' 70
Extending his analysis to the Gates facts, Justice White noted
that the best argument for the good faith exception arises where a
police officer acts pursuant to a search warrant which is later de-
clared unconstitutional. 7 ' In such cases, the police officer has done
everything conceivable to comply with constitutional prerequisites
and fourth amendment interests will not be advanced by excluding
the evidence.
72
Justice White stopped short, however, of endorsing a blanket
rule of admissibility for evidence seized pursuant to a defective war-
rant. Justice White favored retaining the exclusionary rule in those
instances where its deterrent objectives could still be served. Specifi-
cally, Justice White would apply the exclusionary rule in three situa-
tions: (1) where a magistrate or judge plainly had "no business"
issuing a warrant; (2) where a magistrate or judge relied on false or
misleading information; and (3) where the warrant clearly lacks a
probable cause basis.7 3 In these instances, exclusion of the evidence
would still serve a deterrent purpose, even though a warrant had
been issued.
Currently, Justice White's good faith exception stands as a
66 Justice White also concurred with the majority's finding that the defendant's fourth
amendment rights had not been violated. However, Justice White did not favor the Court's
decision to abandon Aguilar and Spineli to reach this result. 103 S. Ct. at 2347.
67 Id at 2340.
68 Id at 2341 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)).
69 Id at 2343-44.
70 Id at 2344.
71 Id
72 Id at 2345.
73 Id at 2345-46.
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promising proposal, the specific contours of which have not been
fully explored. As Gates demonstrates, the Court has been reluctant
to directly confront the good faith issue. However, Massachusetts v.
Sheppard,74 a case currently pending before the Supreme Court, af-
fords the Court a convenient opportunity to consider Justice White's
good faith proposal.
B. Massachusetts v. Sheppard: Appvying the Good Faith Exception
Massachusetts v. Sheppard presents an apt setting in which to de-
bate the good faith exception. In Sheppard, police officers investigat-
ing a macabre murder 75 obtained substantial evidence linking the
defendant to the crime. 76 Armed with this information, the police
sought an arrest warrant and a warrant to search Sheppard's resi-
dence. 77 An experienced police officer 78 prepared an affidavit ex-
plaining the incriminating information gathered against the
defendant and listing the evidence the police sought to recover in the
search.79 The district attorney, his first assistant, and a police ser-
geant all examined the affidavit and concluded that it established
probable cause to seek a warrant.80
The officer then attempted to procure a proper warrant for a
search.8 ' As it was Sunday, no clerks or assistants were available to
74 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983).
75 In Sheppard, police officers discovered the victim's severely beaten and burned body in
a vacant lot in the Boston area. 441 N.E.2d at 726. Pieces of wire were found attached to the
victim's leg and lying near her body. Further investigation revealed the victim's identifica-
tion and led police officers to the defendant, Jimmy Sheppard, who had been identified as the
victim's boyfriend. Id. A police officer eventually located Sheppard who voluntarily agreed
to accompany the officer to the police station. In response to questions, Sheppard informed
the police that he had been at a "gaming house" the entire night of the murder and had
neither left the house nor seen the victim. Id. at 726-27.
After talking with various patrons, however, the police learned that Sheppard had bor-
rowed an automobile and left the "gaming house" between 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. Id. at 727.
With the owner's permission, the police inspected the automobile and found bloodstains in
the trunk compartment and on the bumper. The owner informed police that the blood had
not been present before he had loaned his car to Sheppard. Id. Based on this information,
the police then attempted to procure a warrant. Id
76 The Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court unanimously agreed that the police had
established probable cause linking the defendant to the murder. Id at 733, 737 (Liacos, J.,
concurring), 745 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
77 Id at 727.
78 The investigating police officer in Sheppard had nineteen years of experience, ten of
which had been as a detective. Id at 738 (Liacos, J., concurring).
79 Id at 727.
80 Id
81 Id at 728.
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assist him. 82 Unable to find a suitable warrant, the officer modified
a standard "controlled substances" form for his purposes.
83
The officer then presented the affidavit and warrants to a judge
who determined that probable cause existed for both warrants. 84 Af-
ter making some minor changes,85 the judge dated and signed the
warrants.8 6 The judge did not alter the substantive portion of the
search warrant (which merely authorized the police to search for
"controlled substances"), nor did he attach or incorporate by refer-
ence the officer's affidavit describing the articles the police actually
hoped to seize.
8 7
Relying on the apparent propriety of the altered warrant, the
police searched the defendant's residence,88 recovering bloodstained
clothing and other evidence linking Sheppard to the murder.8 9 At
trial, the judge denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evi-
dence. Although he acknowledged that the defective warrant vio-
lated the fourth amendment, 90 the trial judge refused to invoke the
exclusionary rule given the police officer's apparent good faith ef-
82 Id
83 According to the evidence adduced at trial, the police officer:
[C]rossed out the words "controlled substance" on the cover side of the form. On
the face side, he replaced the word "Dorchester" with the word "Roxbury." He
inserted a reference to "2nd & Basement" of 42 Deckard Street as the place of the
search. However, the reference to "controlled substance" was not deleted in those
portions of the form that constituted the application for a search warrant and would
constitute the warrant itself.
Id
84 Id
85 According to Petitioner's Brief-
[T]he judge crossed out with a pen the name of the Chief Justice of the Dorchester
Court. . . and crossed out the printed word "Dorchester" in the clause, and substi-
tuted his own name and the name of the court of the jurisdiction in which the
warrant was sought. . .. On the cover side he struck the words "Dorchester Dis-
trict" and substituted "Roxbury Division Mass. Trial Court .... "
Brief for the Petitioner at 7, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725
(1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983).
86 441 N.E.2d at 728.
87 Id
88 When the police arrived at the defendant's residence, the defendant was not present.
However, Sheppard's mother and sister were present. The police showed the warrant to
Sheppard's mother and sister before they conducted the search. Id
89 The items seized included: bloodstained black boots, chips of dried blood, two un-
matched women's earrings, a bloodstained envelope, bloodstained men's shorts, women's leo-
tards, three types of wire and a women's hair piece. The officers apparently did not search
beyond the geographic area listed in the affidavit, nor did the officers seize evidence unrelated
to the homicide. Id at 728-29.
90 Id at 730.
[1984]
GOOD FAITH tXCEPTION
forts.9 ' In an extensive opinion, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court reversed, finding that the exclusionary rule required suppres-
sion of the evidence.92 The Supreme Court subsequently granted cer-
tiorari on the question of whether the exclusionary rule should apply
where the police rely in good faith on a defective warrant.
93
C. The Good Faith Test: A Subjective and Objective Anal sis
Sheppard provides an ideal setting for discussing the subjective
and objective aspects of the good faith exception. In many respects,
Sheppard presents an ironic twist to the conventional dispute over
subjective and objective reliance. As its proponents suggest, to satisfy
good faith requirements the police officer's conduct should satisfy
both subjective and objective standards. 94 In other words, not only
must the police officer possess a subjective good faith belief in the
propriety of his actions, but that belief must also be "grounded in
objective reasonableness." 95  Critics of the good faith exception
quickly point out the inherent difficulty of determining good faith.
9 6
Sheppard, however, illustrates how a court could easily make a good
faith determination in some cases.
The conduct of the police officers in Sheppard does not demon-
strate a wicked or evil intent. To the contrary, their investigatory
efforts comport with those of conscientious law enforcement officers
concerned with following proper police procedure.97 After obtaining
sufficient information to support their suspicions, the officers
presented their case to a judge to obtain official sanction for their
search. Furthermore, the officers conducted the actual search in a
manner which demonstrates an absence of malicious intent. At no
time, it appears, did the police exceed the bounds of the affidavit in
either the areas searched or the items seized.98 Based on these fac-
91 Id.
92 I d at 725-36. Writing for a plurality of a sharply divided court, Justice Wilkins
doubted whether the exclusionary rule would deter a police officer who has acted in good
faith reliance on a defective warrant. Nevertheless, he felt constrained by Supreme Court
precedent to suppress the evidence that the police had seized. Id
93 Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983).
94 See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2344 n.15 (1983) (White, J., concurring); United
States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 841 n.4a (5th Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
95 622 F.2d at 841 n.4a.
96 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.2, at 3-19 (Supp. 1984) [hereinafter cited as
LAFAVE].
97 See notes 76-84 supra and accompanying text.
98 See note 89 supra.
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tors, it can hardly be said that the police did not act in subjective
good faith.
Thus, for their actions to fail the good faith test, it must be be-
cause of an absence of objective good faith. In this analysis, the ques-
tion arises whether a police officer acts with objective good faith, or
"reasonably," by seizing items not specifically named on the war-
rant's face. An inerudite response would suggest that he has not. Un-
doubtedly, a warrant acts as a judicial restraint on the police officer's
authority to execute the search.99 By limiting the scope of the search
to those areas and items specifically stated, the warrant minimizes
the intrusive nature of the officer's actions. When an officer ignores
the warrant or exceeds its bounds, his conduct appears, at first blush,
to have not been "reasonable." Accordingly, the good faith excep-
tion should not apply.
While appealing, the above argument is both shortsighted and
misleading. First, it ignores the many situations in which a police
officer acts in an objectively reasonable manner in seizing evidence
not specifically mentioned in the warrant. For example, under the
"plain view" doctrine an officer need not ignore relevant evidence he
might inadvertently spot, even though the warrant does not expressly
authorize its seizure.' 00 Second, and most important, the analysis
evades the central focus of the good faith inquiry. The court's in-
quiry under the exception should include all factors bearing on the
officer's good faith, not simply his adherence to the judicially-issued
document itself. Indeed, it would have been unreasonable for the
investigating officer in Sheppard to conduct the search in strict accord-
ance with language on the warrant's face. Rather, a "reasonable"
police officer in this situation would rely on what the judge had
seemingly authorized by adapting and signing the warrant - a
search of the defendant's premises for the items listed in the affidavit.
D. Good Faith and the "Magistrate Shopping" Syndrome
By its nature, the good faith exception requires a court to deter-
mine whether or not a police officer's conduct has been objectiona-
99 See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979); Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319
(1979); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886).
100 For cases discussing the "plain view" doctrine, see, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971); United States v. Truitt 521 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1975). Some circuit
courts have also found that various contraband and other items pertaining to the crime may
be seized even though they are not specifically mentioned in the warrant. See, e.g., United
States v. Bridges, 419 F.2d 963 (8th Cir. 1969); see a/so C. WHITEBREAD,SUpra note 31, at 121.
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ble. Where the police officer engages in objectionable conduct, then
the good faith exception does not apply. Critics argue, however, that
a good faith exception would, in itself, promote rather than dissuade
objectionable police behavior. 10 A good faith exception, critics ar-
gue, would foster a "careless attitude" in police officers toward fol-
lowing proper police procedure. 0
2
One specific objection voiced by the critics is that the good faith
exception would promote "magistrate shopping," or instances where
a police officer intentionally seeks a lenient judge to issue the war-
rant. 10 3 Conceivably, this problem could arise in cases where the
police have only marginal evidence against the defendant. In such a
case, a police officer might prefer one magistrate over another given
their different propensities in finding probable cause. 0 4 While po-
tentially a problem, Justice White's good faith proposal has safe-
guards to prevent this occurrence. Under Justice White's proposal, a
court could still exclude evidence in certain situations, even though a
warrant has been issued. For example, where a magistrate plainly
has "no business" issuing a warrant, or issues a warrant where prob-
able cause is plainly lacking, the exclusionary rule could still be in-
voked. 10 5 Retention of the exclusionary rule in these cases removes
any advantage a police officer might have in seeking a lenient judge.
Whatever merit the "magistrate shopping" argument might
have, it clearly does not apply to cases like Shepard where the police
have gathered substantial probable cause to support a warrant.
Through their extensive investigatory work, the police in Sheppard
had established a strong case against the defendant. Witnesses had
been interviewed and alibis rebuffed. All of the evidence pointed to
the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. 0 6 The district attor-
ney had examined the evidence and concluded that the police had
probable cause to support a warrant. Under these circumstances,
even the staunchest defender of fourth amendment liberties would
have issued a warrant.107 Thus, in light of the officer's solid case, it
101 Se, e.g., 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 96, at 15-16 (Supp. 1984).
102 Id at 16.
103 See, e.g., Oral Argument in United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983), at 52 U.S.L.W. 3543 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1984).
104 See, e.g., L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 120,
204 (1967).
105 See 103 S. Ct. at 2345-46. For further discussion of Justice White's good faith proposal,
see notes 66-74 supra and accompanying text.
106 See note 75 supra.
107 The probable cause showing was so evident that it received only a cursory discussion
by the Massachusetts Supreme Court on appeal. See note 76 supra.
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can hardly be said that they had an incentive to "hedge" the facts or
seek a lenient magistrate. Rather, given the "high stakes" involved
in Sheppard, the police would have had the exact opposite motivation.
Like any individual, a police officer does not want his hard work and
efforts to go to waste. The police had expended many hours of inves-
tigatory work to get to the defendant's doorstep. Any conscientious
police officer in this situation would probably prefer a competent
magistrate, ensuring that any evidence obtained in the search would
not be suppressed due to a defective warrant.
III. An Alternative "Harmless Error" Proposal
As the above analysis indicates, the good faith exception pro-
vides one possible means of avoiding the otherwise harsh results of
the exclusionary rule in cases like Sheppard. However persuasive the
good faith exception might be, it should not preclude consideration
of potentially more viable proposals. Accordingly, this section pro-
poses a "harmless error" alternative which could make it unnecessary
for a court to even reach the good faith question in cases involving
facially defective warrants. 0 8
A good faith exception inherently requires that a court make
cumbersome inquiries into a police officer's subjective and objective
good faith. Such inquiries could further burden already overloaded
courts. A "harmless error" rule, which would focus on the actual
impact of the unconstitutional warrant on the defendant's fourth
amendment rights, could avoid these burdens.
Traditionally, the harmless error rule has been used as an appel-
late device to restrict the exclusionary rule's application in fourth
amendment cases under review. 10 9 The harmless error doctrine al-
lows an appellate court to uphold a conviction where the admission
of unconstitutionally seized evidence did not significantly prejudice
the defendant's interests at trial." 0 The Supreme Court could ex-
tend the harmless error reasoning to the trial court level and the ini-
tial suppression determination. At the suppression hearing, the trial
judge could determine whether the facially "unconstitutional" war-
108 The harmless error exception would be an intermediate step that a court would apply
after finding that the warrant violated fourth amendment particularity requirements, but
before determining whether the police acted in good faith.
109 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963);
see also 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 96, at 735.
110 See, e.g., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972) (involving improper pretrial con-
fession); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972) (involving an erroneously admitted confes-
sion); see also 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 96, at 735-49.
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rant infact prejudiced the defendant's fourth amendment rights. If
not, then the court would not invoke the exclusionary rule.
An advantage of a harmless error exception would be its limited
application. Courts would only apply the exception to cases, like
Sheppard, where the police have acted pursuant to a facially defective
search warrant."' Moreover, the harmless error exception would ap-
ply only where the warrant's defect did not significantly prejudice
the defendant's fourth amendment interests. Similar to the tradi-
tional harmless error doctrine, 112 the state would bear the burden of
proving a harmless result."13
Sheppard illustrates the kind of case in which a court could apply
a "harmless error" exception. While the warrant in Sheppard failed to
pass constitutional muster, that failure did not actually prejudice the
defendant's rights. Undoubtedly, the police officers in Sheppard had
probable cause to support their warrant. 114 However, Sheppard ob-
jected to the judge's failure to state in the warrant the particular
items to be seized, as required by the fourth amendment. 15 Assum-
ing the warrant in Sheppard thereby violated fourth amendment re-
quirements, 116 the court should next inquire, under a harmless error
rule, whether the defendant suffered any actual "harm" as a result of
this violation. In making this determination, a court must consider
the rights protected by the warrant clause. Essentially, the particu-
larity requirement of the warrant clause serves two major functions:
(1) it places the person subject to the seizure on notice as to what the
111 The authors do not advocate extending the harmless error rule to warrants issued on
insufficient probable cause. Such warrants inherently "harm" the defendant's fourth amend-
ment interests given the insufficient factual justification to support the police officer's intru-
sion in the first instance. Rather, the admissibility of evidence in these circumstances should
be governed by the good faith exception discussed in Part II supra.
112 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
113 The "harm" at issue is the harm to the defendant's fourth amendment rights and not
the harm in having the evidence admitted at trial. The difference is one between right and
remedy. The defendant does not have the constitutional right to have the evidence illegally
seized from his home excluded at trial. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
He has only the constitutional right to be free from searches and seizures that do not conform
to the fourth amendment's requirements. If the search does not so conform, and if deterrence
can be served, only then does the exclusionary remedy apply.
114 See notes 76 and 106 supra.
115 See notes 84-87 supra and accompanying text.
116 During oral argument in Sheppard, some of the Justices asked questions suggesting that
perhaps no constitutional violation occurred at all. 52 U.S.L.W. 3541-42 (U.S. Jan, 24,1984).
Such a finding, however, would not only be inconsistent with the Massachusetts Supreme
Court's characterization of the warrant, 441 N.E.2d at 732, but also contrary to existing
Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92 n.4 (1979); Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
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officer is entitled to seize; and (2) it protects the individual against
"general searches" by limiting the search to those areas and items
specifically stated in the warrant.'
7
Viewed in this light, Sheppard did not suffer any injury as a
consequence of the facially defective warrant. First, while defective,
the warrant did not actually prejudice the defendant by failing to
put him on notice. The defendant was not present when the police
arrived at his house."I8 He therefore cannot complain that the defec-
tive warrant failed to provide him with adequate notice." t9
Second, and most important, the actual manner in which the po-
lice conducted their search did not harm the defendant's fourth
amendment rights. The officers never exceeded the bounds specified
in their affidavit. 20 They searched only those places (i.e. the second
floor and the basement) specifically authorized by the warrant and
seized only those items relevant to the homicide. 12  They neither
"rummaged" through the defendant's belongings nor seized evidence
which they did not have probable cause to seize.' 22 In short, none of
the abuses commonly associated with an unconstitutionally vague
warrant actually occurred in Sheppard.123
Applying a "harmless error" rule in cases involving facially de-
fective warrants would not constitute a sharp departure from existing
search and seizure doctrine. Indeed, courts already recognize a simi-
lar type of exception in wiretap cases involving facially defective
court orders.' 24 In these cases, courts have recognized that facial de-
117 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
118 According to the Massachusetts Supreme Court's opinion:
At about 5 P.M. Detective O'Malley and others were admitted to 42 Deckard
Street. Detective O'Malley spoke with the defendant's mother and sister, showed
them the warrant, and said the police were going to look in the defendant's room and in the
cellar for things that were implicated in a homicide. It does not appear that either of the
two women read the warrant or asked to have it read.
441 N.E.2d at 728 (emphasis added).
119 Id Even to the extent the notice requirement extends to other individuals on the
premises, they also would not have a valid complaint. The police told the defendant's mother
and sister of both the search's purpose and parameters. The mother and sister's failure to
read the warrant and notice its shortcomings should not constitute grounds for suppressing
the evidence.
120 Id at 728-29.
121 Id. at 745 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
122 See notes 89 and 98 supra and accompanying text.
123 See, e.g., Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467. In discussing the abuses the warrant clause is
aimed at preventing, the Supreme Court stated in Coolidge: "[Tihe specific evil is the 'general
warrant' abhorred by the colonists, and the problem is not that of intrusion per se, but of a
general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings." Id.
124 United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974); see also United States v. Acon, 513 F.2d
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fects in the wiretap order do not constitute automatic grounds for
suppression, especially where the actual wiretap has been conducted
in a reasonable manner.
In summary, applying a "harmless error" exception in cases like
Sheppard would allow judges to make more equitable suppression rul-
ings. The harmless error rule strikes a needed balance between the
constitutional imperatives of the warrant clause and the harsh conse-
quences of invoking the exclusionary rule. By recognizing the war-
rant's constitutional deficiencies, the harmless error rule preserves the
historical importance of the fourth amendment's particularity com-
mand. 125 At the same time, however, the harmless error exception
gives trial judges necessary leeway to avoid excluding probative evi-
dence where the defendant's fourth amendment rights suffered no
actual harm.
In addition to striking this balance, the harmless error exception
also hits at the central problem in these cases: judicial negligence in
issuing a defective warrant. Unquestionably, the party at fault in
cases like Sheppard is not the investigating police officer, but rather
the judge or magistrate who issued the defective warrant. By focus-
ing exclusively on the police officer's conduct, the good faith excep-
tion "glosses over" the judicial blunder in its rush to find the
evidence admissible. In contrast, the harmless error rule directly ad-
dresses the judge's error in determining whether or not that error
significantly affected the defendant's rights. This overt recognition of
judicial error would reprimand the issuing judge for his mistake as
well as educate other members of the judiciary of the constitutional
imperatives of precision and specificity in issuing warrants.
IV. Conclusion
Since its inception, the exclusionary rule has been the target of
continuous criticism. Much of this criticism has, of course, been jus-
tified. Unquestionably, the exclusionary rule exacts a heavy price on
513 (3d Cir. 1975) (wire tap order improperly signed by an assistant attorney general); United
States v. Poeta, 455 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 948 (1972) (where issuing judge
inadvertently crossed out the wrong paragraph on standardized wiretap order); United
States v. Ceraso, 467 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1972) (attorney general merely initialed wiretap order
and did not sign it).
125 Thus, application of a harmless error exception would be more advantageous than a
simple finding that no constitutional violation occurred. By recognizing the warrant's consti-
tutional deficiency, a trial court could send a message to the issuing judge informing him of
his error and instructing him, on the constitutional importance of listing items with
particularity.
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the administration of criminal justice. Each time a court invokes the
rule, probative and reliable evidence is kept from the trier of fact. In
the process, the exclusionary rule circumvents the truth-seeking pro-
cess and often frees the guilty.
However, to criticize a doctrine is one thing, to offer constructive
substitutes and alternatives is another. Despite its deficiencies, the
exclusionary rule plays a beneficial role in protecting fourth amend-
ment rights, standing as a judicial commitment to the deterrence of
unconstitutional police behavior. The exclusion of illegally seized ev-
idence also acknowledges both the importance and inviolability of
the individual citizen's privacy right. Any proposed alternative or
modification of the present exclusionary doctrine must also recognize
these important objectives.
The good faith exception presents one such possible alternative.
By retaining the exclusionary rule in instances where police miscon-
duct can be deterred, the good faith exception seeks a balance be-
tween effective law enforcement and protection of individual liberty
interests. While appealing, the good faith exception is not a panacea
for all fourth amendment violations and should not preclude consid-
eration of other, possibly more effective, proposals.
Accordingly, a harmless error alternative could apply in cases
involving facially defective warrants. In these cases, applying a good
faith exception unnecessarily skews the court's inquiry. By focusing
exclusively on the police officer's conduct, the good faith exception
diverts the court's attention from the real errant party - the judge
or magistrate who issued the warrant. Applying a good faith test in
these circumstances does very little to educate the issuing judge or
magistrate on his error.
By applying a harmless error rule in these situations, a court
could better educate the judge or magistrate on the constitutional
significance of his mistake. At the same time, the harmless error rule
removes the shackles which had previously required that a trial judge
automatically suppress the evidence in these cases, even though the
defendant's fourth amendment rights had not been actually harmed.
In short, a harmless error exception could help to calm what has tra-
ditionally been a troubled area in fourth amendment law.
[1984]
